

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 August 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM

(Sweden)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Bulgaria: Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. G. GAVRILOV

Burma: U KYAW MIN

Canada: Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. WINKLER
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia: Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India: Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy: Mr. R. CARACCIOLI
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO

Mexico: Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria: Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland: Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. I. VIRGIN
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. V.P. SUSLOV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. O. SIRRY

United Kingdom:

The Rt. Hon. F. MULLEY
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
Mr. G. BREAM

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the 319th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): I have read with great interest the important speeches which have been made to the Committee since I was last here. My Government is studying with care the proposals made and in particular those made by the Foreign Minister of Italy at our last meeting. In this connexion I should like to reaffirm my Government's conviction that a non-proliferation treaty should encourage, and not hinder, the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

3. When I previously had the privilege of addressing the Committee, on 22 June (ENDC/PV.307), I said I realized that in this field I must learn to be patient and had been so advised by several colleagues around this table. I have done my best to follow that advice, but I am bound to say I am extremely disappointed to find on 3 August that we have no draft treaty before us and, as far as I can discover, have made no further progress towards achieving a non-proliferation treaty. I venture to suggest that the task facing us is one of the most important and urgent tasks placed upon any committee. Judging from the many speeches made here, all delegations, from nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike, are anxious to make rapid progress towards a treaty. There is no need for me to argue the case again today after the admirable speech of the representative of Poland at our last meeting, which put the issue before us with great force and clarity.

4. I am sure that the co-Chairmen are well aware of the facts, and I know they and their Governments have a sincere desire to achieve a treaty acceptable to the great majority of nations before the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee reassembles in the autumn. Time, however, is passing; and if a draft treaty is not submitted very soon there may be insufficient time to turn it from a draft into a treaty. We all know that there are likely to be problems to resolve after we have a draft text. Failure to agree on a non-proliferation treaty now would not only be a serious and grave setback in this particular field of arms control after so many hopes have been aroused by the general agreement in principle; it would also, I fear, discourage all those who share with my Government the objective of moving towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

5. Therefore I would urge our co-Chairmen, and particularly, if I may, the representative of the Soviet Union, to convey to their Governments the deep and widely-felt dismay evinced by all those who have the cause of arms control at heart at the stalemate we have reached for lack of a formal presentation of the joint draft. I speak for my Government, and my Government alone, in saying this; but I believe that the sentiments I have expressed will be shared by many of my colleagues.

6. We were charged by the General Assembly in its resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161) to give priority to the non-proliferation treaty; and I feel we must have something positive to report when we go to New York. However, one useful effect of the great delay on non-proliferation has been the attention the Committee has again given to the important question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; and I should like to make a contribution this morning to the discussions on this subject.

7. In this connexion I should like to comment on the two speeches made by the representatives of Sweden — by Mrs. Myrdal on 29 June (ENDC/PV.309) and by Mr. Edelstam on 20 July (ENDC/PV.315) — together with the memorandum (ENDC/191) circulated by the Swedish delegation on 19 July. It is right that we should not forget the other measures recommended to our attention by the United Nations General Assembly. It is generally agreed that a comprehensive test ban is one of the most important and urgent of those. Perhaps I should begin by saying that I am no scientist myself and ask you, Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues to bear with me if at any point I go astray in the considerable technical complexity of this subject.

8. On the political side the aim of the British Government remains unchanged. My Government continues to support all efforts to reach a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which we would sign with the greatest satisfaction once agreement on its terms were reached. Such a treaty would be an important step on the road to nuclear disarmament, would help to damp down the race to develop more and more sophisticated weapons, and would contribute to the security of all States in the world. But I should point out at the outset of my remarks that, for such a treaty to last and to achieve those effects, it must be of such a kind that each signatory can be confident that it is being observed by all the others.

9. The technical problems involved in verifying that a complete ban on nuclear tests is being observed depend first on the ability to detect all seismic events above a certain magnitude. The range of events capable of detection must include all militarily important underground tests. How large an underground explosion must be

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

to be considered militarily important is of course a matter on which there may be differences of opinion. In what follows I shall deal only with events above the detection threshold, which is at present, I believe, at about magnitude 4, and only with seismic means of detection and identification.

10. After detection, there is the problem of identification of the events recorded on the seismograph. It is customary to divide this second problem into two parts, as the Swedish delegation has done in its treatment of the question. First, what proportion of earthquakes can we identify? Second, is it possible to identify militarily significant underground nuclear tests, and, if so, with what degree of certainty? Those two problems are of course interrelated; and indeed, if it were possible to solve the first completely, the second would be solved as well. If it were possible, that is, to detect and identify all earthquakes above a certain size as such, then any other underground events could be identified, by a process of elimination, as being underground explosions. However, to be able to be sure of identifying 100 per cent of all earthquakes would be to attain perfection, a rare achievement in applied science. We have certainly not reached that point yet.

11. According to expert advice available to my Government, the present scientific position seems to be as follows. Identification of earthquakes can be done by a combination of criteria such as depth of focus, first motion and, particularly, complexity. In addition, the technique of surface wave analysis has recently shown new promise for the positive identification of underground tests. We believe that, through careful deployment of improved long-period seismometers for recording surface waves, we should expect to reduce the level of discrimination from seismic magnitude 5 to about 4.5. However, even if that expectation were fulfilled, we should still be left with some unidentified events of a seismic magnitude that would fall within the limits that we should seek to include in a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

12. On technical grounds at least, that suggests that the cause of some seismic events could not be fully established by long-range seismic recording alone. Representatives will recall the report of the British Atomic Weapons Research Establishment published in November 1965 on detection and recognition of underground explosions, which was circulated to the Committee. That informal report brings out the fact that the number of earthquakes producing less complex and sharp signals which might be mistaken for underground explosions is highly variable within any year. The conclusion of that report, taking one area as an example, is that between 80 and 85 per cent of earthquakes above magnitude 4 are now identifiable. The number should rise to 90 per cent as techniques improve.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

13. I should now like to comment briefly on the Swedish memorandum itself in the light of what I have just said. It does not seem to introduce any new basic criteria or data collection method into the situation. It seems to suggest that by processing the data in a particular way, by application of the decision theory, it may be possible to demonstrate that the data now obtainable and the criteria now available are sufficient to give a certain degree of deterrence. That would amount to a 10 per cent probability of uncovering violations if they occurred at a rate of one per year, with a small chance of false identification. That is an interesting approach and one which we should be glad to examine further when more details are available.

14. My delegation is also interested in the references in Mrs. Myrdal's speech to regional or local seismological data (ENDC/PV.309, para. 21), and would be very pleased to have further details on that subject. The valuable work already begun by the "nuclear detection club" is highly relevant here. We hope that its activities can be further expanded. The more countries that develop an advanced seismographic capacity the better, for a number of reasons. One reason is that it is not possible, I am told, to detect and analyse surface waves at such distances as are possible with other techniques. But I do not believe that a treaty whose control system depended on data supplied unchecked by individual signatory States would be viable. That would be self-inspection - something which members of this Committee have argued is unacceptable in the context of a non-proliferation treaty; and indeed in this context no one has suggested that the treaty should depend on purely national control systems.

15. The Swedish memorandum deals with the probability factor in the case of a treaty with provision for on-site inspection, and in the opposite case where on-site inspection would not be included. I think we should be very careful in making comparisons between the probability factors in each of those cases. Whatever value one may attach to the probability of a particular on-site inspection identifying an underground explosion, the fact is that, once inspectors on the ground have positively identified an illicit explosion, considerations of probability go out of the window. The State which has violated the treaty, the inspection team and the government or governments providing it, and the rest of the world -- at least the scientific world -- are confronted not with a probability but with a certainty. The treaty has been violated. Concrete evidence, such as radioactive debris, has been discovered. Given, say, one clandestine explosion a year, the probability of one of the small number of inspections allowed for in a treaty hitting the nail on the head may be quite small. However, from the point of

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

view of a State calculating the risk of being caught violating the treaty, the deterrent value is still very great.

16. If there is no provision for on-site inspections the situation is entirely different, since that ultimate certainty is lacking. That point is touched upon in the Swedish memorandum, which reads:

"In the case of control without on-site inspections, the guarantee given by the inspections against mistaking in the final assessment earthquakes for explosions does not exist and has to be replaced by an extremely low probability for making such mistakes." (ENDC/191, p. 5)

The memorandum goes on to consider how that probability is measured and what degree of probability would be needed for a treaty.

17. But that seems to me to miss two important points. The first is that, not only can earthquakes be mistaken for explosions, but explosions can be mistaken for earthquakes. In his speech on 11 July the representative of the United States referred to this problem, which he described as the problem dealt with in the Swedish paper in reverse and as being "more vital to the national security of the parties" (ENDC/PV.312, para. 17). I notice that in your speech of 20 July (ENDC/PV.315), Mr. Chairman, you did not reply to that part of Mr. Foster's statement.

18. The second point which seems to me to be omitted from the Swedish analysis is the question of what happens in a treaty without inspections if it appears to the scientific community that it is extremely probable from an examination of all the seismographic criteria that a particular seismic event was an underground explosion. I say "probable", not "certain". Supposing the degree of probability is estimated at 95 per cent, what happens next? There would be those who would say that the State suspected of a violation should be given the benefit of the doubt so that the treaty itself would not be jeopardized. It might be that those holding such an opinion would be so numerous or so influential in international affairs that a considerable degree of odium would fall on a State which decided to withdraw from the treaty on the ground that a violation had almost certainly occurred. Such a withdrawal might be made more likely if that State had unpublishable but conclusive evidence from intelligence sources that a violation had in fact occurred. We might be left with the treaty destroyed and the atmosphere of international confidence worse than if it had never been signed.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

19. I hope you will not think me too pessimistic in setting these considerations before the Committee; but it seems to me that we are up against a serious problem here: that of positively identifying underground explosions as such without any shadow of doubt. As long as it appears that such a doubt, however small, is likely to persist in every case, it is difficult to see how a satisfactory degree of deterrence against a State's secretly violating a treaty can be achieved, even with considerable further advances in seismographic techniques, without some additional factor being added to the equation.

20. It may be relevant here to recall that during the 1966 session of this Conference, in a speech on 4 August, Mrs. Myrdal tried to deal with the political problems of verification by postulating a system of challenge, or verification by consent (ENDC/PV.279, page 9). At that time my delegation welcomed that attempt to solve the central difficulty of the test-ban treaty by superimposing a political procedure on the technical situation. It is a pity that the representative of the Soviet Union, after a short delay, expressed a firmly negative response to the concept. That may be one reason why the Swedish delegation has not returned to it in its recent exposé of the technical aspects of the problem; but I believe that we should still bear it in mind. It may be that with further technological progress scientific techniques alone may provide the answer, even without on-site inspections. However, I think it will be clear from what I have said today that my Government does not believe that that point has yet been reached.

21. I should like to conclude with a few more general remarks. It has often been argued that political factors will be decisive in reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban. There is of course some truth in that. As long as nations regard each other's policies with a certain degree of suspicion, as long as nations find it impossible for reasons of national security to opt out of the race to develop more and more sophisticated weapons of offence and defence, it will be hard for governments to tolerate even a very small risk that provisions for verification in a treaty may prove inadequate and may allow others to carry out militarily-significant research which could not be completed without a small number of clandestine explosions. Furthermore, one cannot ignore the fact that, with the same system of verification, the risk may be different for different States because of the

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

varying degree of secrecy which it is possible to impose in each State. As the representative of the United States said on 11 July:

"... one of two parties cannot be expected to cease an activity in which both are engaged and which is an important factor in their strategic relationship unless it is convinced that the other party also is ending that activity." (ENDC/PV.312, para. 10)

22. I hope that we shall obtain a non-proliferation treaty, and that once this is signed the political atmosphere will be eased and the comprehensive test-ban treaty, along with other steps to halt the arms race, will become easier to achieve. We must never forget that the pressures now are mounting for an escalation in nuclear armaments, and that the troubled world is looking to us in this Committee to provide a means of halting it and putting it into reverse.

23. With increased détente we can expect a decrease in mutual suspicion which should smooth the way for political decisions. But political considerations and political decisions would be much easier if we had an agreed estimate of the possibilities offered by scientific techniques at a given level of development. These techniques are being improved all the time; and we are proud of the considerable efforts which are being made in my own country, in co-operation with seismologists of other countries, to increase the range and the sensitivity of seismographic techniques. However, there is a real need for broadening the scope of international discussion, for two reasons. First, it would avoid any duplication of effort. Secondly, it would help to achieve an agreed estimate of the technical possibilities by scientists in the States whose security would be most affected by a test ban.

24. Scientific agreement would be a most important step towards political agreement at the government level. My Government is willing and anxious to make any contribution it can to achieve that end. I know that some other governments with expertise in this field have expressed a similar readiness. We recently had hopes that the Soviet Union, whose programme of seismological research we know to be advanced, would be prepared to take part in such technical discussions. Even if the Soviet contention were correct that the political will for an agreement is lacking, which is certainly not the case for my Government, it would still be true that technical discussions would help to clear the ground for agreement. I hope that we have not heard the last word from the Soviet Union on this question. Meanwhile we shall continue our efforts to improve the existing techniques in this field.

25. Mr. BURNS (Canada): Today I am going to speak about the non-proliferation treaty, the draft of which we all hope to see very soon. I shall be speaking, more particularly, of certain conditions which the Canadian delegation believes should be attached to that treaty, or certain agreements which should be made collateral to it. What I shall be saying, of course, will be more or less a repetition of what my delegation has already said at various times. However, other delegations here have gone through a somewhat similar exercise; and, as a long time has gone by while the Conference has been waiting for the draft treaty to appear, it may be that reviews of positions are not superfluous.

26. I think that all delegations here are aware that the Canadian Government has always accepted that a non-proliferation treaty in its essence must be to some degree discriminatory. However, it is the only alternative to allowing the continued spread of nuclear weapons, the coming into being of more military nuclear Powers -- and such a process in the end would have no other result than nuclear war, and probably nuclear war eventually on the greatest scale. It is the main purpose of all of us here to stop such a catastrophe from occurring.

27. Nevertheless, while Canada realizes that there is bound to be some discrimination in a non-proliferation treaty, we have always urged that such discrimination should be limited as far as possible; and we believe that it is possible for the nuclear Powers to agree to measures which will lessen the discrimination in certain aspects.

28. Another point which we have made in common with other delegations here, and also in the United Nations General Assembly, is that a non-proliferation treaty should be only the first step in a series of measures which would further limit the danger of a nuclear war and in the end lead to the abolition of nuclear weaponry. If the treaty is to be accepted by all countries which are concerned, particularly by those countries which have the capacity to make nuclear weapons for themselves, then it must be seen to be a step in the disarmament process and not merely something which, after being achieved, is left to stand by itself. Furthermore, this Committee must be concerned that the draft treaty will contain such provisions or be accompanied by collateral arrangements on the points I shall mention which will make it negotiable with all the countries in the category of potential military nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

29. When we talk of the balance of obligations and responsibilities, referring to General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), what do we have in mind? One particular point is the provision of guarantees for the security of certain countries which are not allied to any great nuclear Powers and which may be in a situation at some time or other where they may face the threat of having nuclear weapons used against them -- may be subject, as the expression has it, to "nuclear blackmail". To make any such guarantee of security effective or credible, of course, presents considerable difficulties. It would have to be stated in terms which would be very difficult, if not impossible, to include within the non-proliferation treaty itself. Perhaps the most that could be expressed in the treaty itself would be a statement in general terms that the nuclear Powers bear a responsibility for safeguarding the nuclear peace, if I may put it that way.

30. One way to state the right to security against attack by nuclear weapons for those countries which are willing to forgo the right to make these themselves might be by way of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly; but that probably would have to be reinforced by other assurances. We would call to mind again the fact that the nuclear Powers are also the permanent members of the Security Council; and I think it is reasonable to say that in both those capacities they have a particular responsibility for seeing that the peace is kept and that the less powerful countries within the United Nations can live without the fear of being "atomized", so to speak.

31. We also note that an essential part of the treaty will be that those countries signatories of it which do not possess nuclear weapons accept inspection or control of their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is for the purpose of seeing that plutonium or other explosive fissile material is not diverted, allowing nuclear weapons to be made from it. It is quite clearly necessary that the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons should accept such a provision. However, so far it does not appear that the nuclear Powers themselves are also willing to accept IAEA control. Canada is of the opinion that this particular kind of discrimination is not necessary in the treaty and that the nuclear Powers, as well as the nuclearly-unarmed States, should accept control over their peaceful nuclear activities.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

32. The nuclear Powers have told the States which do not possess nuclear weapons that inspection by IAEA will not inhibit their development of nuclear energy or expose them to the possibility of commercial espionage. If they take this stand, why do they reject such safeguards for themselves? We have heard it stated that inspection of the kind that is contemplated for a non-proliferation treaty, and indeed for other measures we have been discussing, holds such danger of military espionage that it should be rejected. Members of the Committee may recall that at our meeting on 20 June last I argued against such a concept (ENDC/PV.306, paras. 21 et seq.). Is it alleged that such danger of military espionage would be attached to inspection by IAEA of the peaceful nuclear activities of all the signatories of the treaty? The Canadian delegation does not believe that there would be any real danger to the national security of any State if such inspection were accepted.

33. We have heard a great deal about "peaceful nuclear explosions" and the desire of those countries which have a developing nuclear industry to preserve the right to be able to make use of the technology of nuclear explosions for civil engineering and other purposes when and if it becomes practicable and safe. The studies and experiments relating to such use of nuclear explosives have not been developed to the point where a practicable and economical technology exists. However, it is expected that some day practical means of using such nuclear explosives may become available. Canada, among other countries, wishes to be assured that if that happens it will not be handicapped in their use because it has signed a non-proliferation treaty. We have repeatedly made it clear, however, that there is no difference between a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes and a nuclear explosion for war purposes. We contend that the solution to this problem is that there should be a firm commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to act, so to speak, as contractors for nuclear explosions and to provide at low cost the nuclear explosive devices -- which are really weapons -- which would be required for use in civil engineering or for other peaceful purposes.

34. We recall that in his statement at our meeting on 13 July the representative of the Soviet Union said the following:

"We consider that this problem, including the procedure and conditions for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, could be settled on the basis of a separate international agreement. Thus the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not be an obstacle to the achievement of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.313, para. 13)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That was an elaboration of a previous statement of the same sort made by Mr. Roshchin at the meeting of 18 May (ENDC/PV.297, para. 21). At the meeting of 8 June Mr. Foster commented on that statement as follows:

"... we would envisage, as suggested by Mr. Roshchin at our meeting of 18 May, that the conditions for carrying out nuclear explosions could be resolved through separate international agreement" (ENDC/PV.303, para.15).

35. It seems, therefore, that there is agreement among the great nuclear Powers that this right to participate in the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions for engineering purposes and the like could be ensured in a separate agreement. Canada would like to see some reference to this undertaking contained in the draft treaty; and we should also like to see a draft of a convention or declaration of the nuclear Powers which would commit them to supplying nuclear explosive devices for this purpose. Of course, any such arrangements should be under proper international safeguards. It might be advisable for the whole procedure to be carried out under the direction and control of the International Atomic Energy Agency, unless it should be found better to set up some other international agency for that specific purpose.

36. We all recall the words of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) to the effect that the non-proliferation treaty should be accompanied by or followed by other measures of disarmament which would reduce the danger of nuclear war. We have heard also various delegations here express their views concerning what such measures might be. First priority seems to be given to an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, already prohibited by the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), in three environments, to which should be added the fourth environment, "underground". United Nations General Assembly resolution 2163 (XXI) requests us to "elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests". (ENDC/185)

37. We have heard today the very thoughtful statement of the representative of the United Kingdom analysing the present position with regard to agreement on an underground test ban. Previously we heard the discussion, to which Mr. Mulley referred, between the Swedish delegation and the United States delegation (ENDC/PV.309, 312), in regard to the degree to which the art and science of detecting and identifying nuclear tests underground by distant means has progressed. It is the Canadian delegation's opinion that this exchange of views could be further developed, and

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

that eventually some agreement could be reached between the nuclear Powers enabling the Moscow Treaty to be completed by the prohibition of underground testing. However, I shall have something to say later in my statement about what may be a reason for the lack of progress in agreement between the nuclear Powers. We know that the overt cause is disagreement over what would be adequate control to ensure that obligations not to test underground are observed.

38. Another measure concerning which I spoke at length previously and which has also been suggested by the non-aligned nations represented here in their manifesto on non-proliferation (ENDC/178) is the stopping of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes. At our 306th meeting I elaborated on that proposal, and naturally I do not want to go into it again at length. However, it does seem to Canada that that would be one of the measures which could be applied by the nuclear Powers to demonstrate their firm intention to halt the arms race, to halt the piling-up of armaments and to start reducing them.

39. In the opinion of the Canadian delegation there is another measure which the nuclear Powers should be considering. That measure is to halt the development and production of ballistic missiles, both offensive and defensive. We know that an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union authorities to discuss that matter was reached some months ago, but we have heard of no further development. We have heard about the desirability of not starting another turn of the spiral of the nuclear arms race by introducing a new factor: that is to say, the introduction of anti-ballistic-missile systems in the Soviet Union and in the United States.

40. I think the arguments against this new escalation are quite well known to everyone around this table. At first sight it may seem reasonable for any country to try to protect itself against the threat of nuclear destruction by installing anti-ballistic-missile systems; but in fact such protection would not be attainable without enormous expenditure, and, furthermore, the balance of deterrence might be upset, with results that are incalculable. The most likely result would be another round in the arms race in which not only would anti-ballistic missiles be introduced but offensive ballistic missiles would be perfected and increased in power, thus making them more destructive and dangerous than those which now exist. The result would be an enormous and wasteful expenditure of money and resources which would produce no additional security to the nations engaging in this super-heated competition in destructive power.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

41. Furthermore, we hear the view advanced that while the development of anti-missile missiles is in prospect the need for underground testing will continue, and that this is the real reason for the lack of interest of the nuclear Powers in trying to lessen the difference between their positions on verification. We have seen the even more disturbing suggestion that to perfect an anti-missile defence system it may be necessary to carry out tests in the atmosphere, thus destroying the Moscow test-ban treaty. We hope that no consideration is being given in governmental quarters anywhere to such a dangerous idea. But that the idea exists indicates the possible extent of the "spin-off" or "fall-out" -- to use terms popular in other contexts -- from a decision to go ahead with the production and extension of anti-missile defences.

42. We hope, therefore, that the nuclear Powers will manage soon to meet to discuss the possibility of freezing the arms race, freezing the production and development of these enormously costly and enormously dangerous weapons, and then proceed to reduce their number.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 319th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Axel Edelstam, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 8 August 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.